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Abstract 
 
In this paper we look at both the theoretical and empirical behavior of price-cost margins when 
capital market imperfections affect firms’ markup policies. We present a model of a firm 
operating in an industry with differentiated products and facing imperfect markets for financing 
operations. The model results in an Euler equation for the optimal price path which is estimated 
using data for several hundreds Italian firms over the period 1981-1993. The empirical results 
suggest that: (i) capital market imperfections are present in the sense that firms in our sample 
pay a premium on external finance which significantly depends on the debt to sales ratio; (ii) 
according to our estimates constrained firms find it optimal to cut price compared to 
unconstrained firms; (iii) as firms are more likely to be financially constrained in recessions, our 
results imply that financial market imperfections tend to make markups procyclical. 
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1. Introduction 
How do capital market imperfections affect firms’ markup policies? Do these 
imperfections tend to make markups procyclical or countercyclical? These are the two 
main issues we address in this paper. 
The literature on the impact of financing constraints on firms’ real decisions has 
received great impetus in recent years following the advances in the theory of 
information and incentives and the increased availability of panel data on individual 
firms. As well documented in Hubbard (1996), capital market imperfections are likely 
to play a role in all types of investment decisions taken by optimizing firms, namely 
investment in fixed capital, human capital, knowledge capital, and investment in 
inventories. One area of this literature that is still largely unexplored concerns the 
impact of financing constraints on another type of investment decision that forward-
looking firms typically make, that is, investment in market shares by appropriately 
pricing their products. 
Most theoretical papers on this subject rely on models of customer markets 
(Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss, 1984; Bils, 1989; Gottfries, 1991) and/or markets with 
consumer switching costs (Klemperer, 1987, 1995; Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1995, 
1996). These models study imperfectly competitive firms which compete for a customer 
base that changes slowly over time as customers purchase a good repeatedly and only 
occasionally compare prices. In this case firms charge a low price for their product to 
attract new customers as a larger customer base tomorrow implies higher profits in the 
future. They therefore price below the single period profit maximizing level. A 
refinement of these models is the case in which customers face a fixed cost of switching 
to a different supplier. In any period firms trade off the benefits from charging a low 
price to attract first time buyers with the costs of not charging a high price to locked-in 
customers. Also here firms charge a price below the single period level to build a base 
of locked-in customers. 
The story just described generally applies to firms that are not liquidity 
constrained and/or not in a recessionary period. In fact, when a firm is cash constrained 
or faces an increasing cost of external debt, it will cut investment in market share and 
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customer base and charge a high price in order to generate cash for debt service, thereby 
foregoing future profits. In summary, the firm’s intertemporal pricing strategy 
previously described is disrupted by the presence of financing constraints. 
Another aspect that has attracted the attention of economists trying to build 
models able to explain the empirical regularity of procyclical factor prices is the 
behavior of price-cost margins. In particular, if markups are countercyclical, this could 
explain why the increase in output that follows a positive demand shock is generally 
accompanied by an increase in the real wage. There are a few alternative explanations 
for countercyclical markups (see Galeotti and Schiantarelli, 1994, and Sembenelli, 
1996): among them, one explanation stresses the impact of capital market imperfections 
on firms’ pricing strategies (Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss, 1984; Chevalier and 
Scharfstein, 1995, 1996). As argued above, firms under the threat of liquidation are less 
likely to set low prices in product differentiated industries in order to gain market 
shares. Since it is in recessionary periods that firms may find it more difficult to raise 
external funds because the value of collateral is low, they will have a greater incentive 
to raise price and increase current cash flow in order to meet their liabilities and to 
finance operations. 
The empirical evidence bearing upon the impact of financing costraints on the 
firm’s pricing strategies and the cyclicality of markups is scant and appears to be 
mostly, if not exclusively, based upon the predictions of models of customer markets. 
According to this theory, we should expect prices to be affected by financial variables, 
especially for firms that are thought to be constrained and in periods of low demand. 
Thus, the data should support the existence of a positive correlation between price and 
debt. Indeed, this is what emerges from the existing empirical evidence in Chevalier and 
Scharfstein (1995, 1996), Chevalier (1995), and Phillips (1995). In addition, these 
studies find that leveraged firms during recessionary periods tend to raise price markups 
(Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1995, 1996). 
Despite the evidence supporting the existence of a link between capital market 
imperfections and markups in product markets with consumer switching costs, there are 
a few issues that are still unresolved. Firstly, as noted by Chevalier and Scharfstein 
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(1996), it is difficult to draw macro-economic inferences from empirical papers where 
very specific models are applied to very specific industries.1 Secondly, there might be 
other, and perhaps more important, channels through which capital market 
imperfections affect firms’ pricing decisions. Indeed, Hendel (1996) presents a 
theoretical model where financially constrained firms tend to reduce prices in bad times 
in order to raise cash at the expense of inventories. His model produces opposite 
predictions relative to the theoretical models discussed above, as we should expect 
procyclical markups, at least in inventory-intensive firms.2 Thirdly, and more generally, 
the idea that financially constrained firms tend to raise prices in recessions does not 
appear to square well with the common wisdom, widely accepted among business 
people, that troublesome firms in a downturn cut prices in order to generate cash. 
Our paper represents a new addition to this relatively unexplored literature both 
theoretically and empirically. By modeling the optimal price decision of a firm which 
operates in an industry with differentiated product and faces imperfect capital markets, 
we provide an alternative channel through which financing constraints can affect firms’ 
markup policies. The basic idea is that firms may find it rational to cut price today in 
order to increase sales beyond the single period profit maximizing level if this allows 
them to face a relatively lower cost of debt tomorrow. This happens to be the case if the 
premium on external finance that banks are expected to set tomorrow is inversely 
correlated with firms’ today sales.3 This represents an alternative explanation of the 
relationship between capital market imperfections and firms’ pricing and markup 
decisions. On the empirical side, we present fresh econometric evidence bearing on the 
effects of capital market imperfections on firms’ pricing policies by estimating a 
dynamic structural markup equation for a large sample of Italian firms operating in 
                                                 
1  Chevalier (1995) and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) study the pricing behavior of supermarket 
chains after they undertook LBOs in the late 80s and during the most recent recession. Phillips (1995) 
look at five industries in which a high number of firms were involved in LBOs. Chevalier and 
Scharfstein (1995) look instead at two-digit manufacturing industries. 
2  Hendel (1996)’s model predicts procyclical prices as well as procyclical inventories for constrained 
firms. In his model firms hold two types of assets: liquid (cash) to pay back debt and non-liquid 
(inventories) to satisfy demand. In a recession firms in financial trouble face a trade-off between 
maximizing current profits and securing survival. They will tend to deviate from one period profit 
maximization by cutting inventories and reducing prices in order to generate the liquid assets needed to 
service their debt. 
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industries with differentiated product. To this end we use a newly developed panel 
dataset. 
We are well aware of recent criticism raised, among others, by Bresnahan 
(1989) concerning the problems associated with comparisons of competition among 
firms operating in different industries. However, following Sutton (1991), we minimize 
these problems not only by estimating the model only for those firms for which the 
embodied assumptions are plausible, i.e. firms operating in product differentiated 
industries, but also by checking the robustness of our conclusions with respect to 
different firms’ strategic behavior. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the optimal 
intertemporal price strategy of a firm producing a differentiated product is modelled. In 
choosing a price path, the firm faces both adjustment costs for output and imperfections 
in the capital market. Also, in order to incorporate oligopolistic interactions in the 
model, both the direct and the strategic effect of price decisions on output levels are 
taken into account. Section 3 discusses in details the implications that can be drawn 
from the model concerning the impact of capital market imperfections on firms’ markup 
policies. For given demand conditions, the crucial parameter turns out to be the degree 
of tightness of product competition. The economic intuition behind this result is 
straightforward. Since becoming larger is a way for firms to lessen financing 
constraints, a monopolistic firm has an obvious incentive to reduce the output price 
below the unconstrained optimal level in order to raise sales. In oligopoly, however, the 
direct effect of a price reduction must be compared and contrasted with the strategic 
effect due to rivals’ behavior. In particular, if rival firms do not match the reduction in 
price, the incentive to cut price for firms facing imperfections in capital markets 
becomes larger compared to the monopoly case. On the contrary, if rival firms react 
through a price war, the predictions made for the monopoly case might even be 
reversed. In Section 4 the characteristics of the dataset used in the empirical 
investigation are highlighted and the relevant descriptive statistics are commented upon. 
Section 5 presents the econometric estimates of the model. The main results can be 
                                                                                                                                               
3  Obviously, this assumption is consistent with the empirical regularity of a lower the cost of debt for 
large firms relative to small ones.  
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summarized as follows. Firstly, capital market imperfections are present in the sense 
that the firms in our sample pay a premium on external finance which significantly 
depends on the debt to sales ratio. Secondly, according to our estimates constrained 
firms find it optimal to cut their price compared to unconstrained firms. This evidence 
corroborates the empirical findings of other papers which typically refer to the U.S. 
experience (Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1995, 1996; Chevalier, 1995; Phillips, 1995). 
Thirdly, as firms are more likely to be financially constrained in recessions, our results 
imply that financial market imperfections tend to make markups procyclical. 
Interestingly, this result runs contrary to the predictions of customer markets/switching 
costs models and is instead in agreement with the predictions of the theoretical model 
by Hendel (1996). Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. The Model 
We model the optimal price decision of a firm producing a differentiated good 
based upon the assumption of profit maximizing behavior. The firm operates in an 
imperfectly competitive market for her product and the price is used as a strategic 
variable. Moreover, the firm faces imperfect capital markets for the funds needed to 
finance her operations. 
The existence of differentiated products leads to equilibrium prices which are 
higher than the corresponding marginal costs, thus generating positive price-cost 
margins. We assume that changing production levels is a costly activity for two reasons. 
Firstly, given capacity, using more variable inputs entails additional expenses: this fact 
is captured by the usual cost function that depends upon variable factor prices as well as 
the amount of output. Secondly, enlarging the productive capacity entails costs 
associated with changing the amounts of quasi-fixed inputs such as capital. These 
adjustment costs are usually taken to be increasing at the margin. Since the focus of this 
paper is on prices and markups, we take the decisions concerning quasi-fixed factors as 
predetermined. We then introduce an adjustment cost function which depends upon the 
rate of change of production as a shortcut for input adjustment costs. We borrow this 
approach from the literature on finished goods inventories and the production 
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smoothing motive (Ramey, 1991; Galeotti, Guiso, Sack, and Schiantarelli, 1996, among 
others). 
Because of capital markets imperfections, we assume that the cost of external 
funds is higher than that of internally generated funds. We model this aspect through an 
increasing cost function of external debt (see, for instance, Bond and Meghir, 1994). 
Debt is taken to be primarily given by bank credit, the major source of both short and 
long term financing for Italian firms. In addition, we will assume that the firm does not 
raise funds through equity issues, another assumption which is quite plausible for the 
Italian case over our sample period.  
The firm’s demand for her product can be represented as follows: 
 
( )q D p vt t t= ,               (1) 
 
where q is the quantity of output produced and p is the corresponding price while the 
variable v represents demand shifters which include the price of rivals’ product. 
The firm chooses price and debt policies in order to maximize the following 
objective: 
 
( ){ ( )[ ( )( ) ( )( )E p D p v c w D p v h D p v D p vt t s
s t
s s s s s s s s s s sβ τ, , , , ( , ), ,
=
∞
− −∑ − − −1 1 1  
  ( ) ] ( ) }− + −− − − − − −i b p D p v b b bs s s s s s s1 1 1 1 1 1, ( , )          (2) 
 
where Et is the expectation operator, βt s,  is the discount factor between periods t and s, 
τ is the corporate income tax rate, c(.) is the firm’s minimum variable cost function 
which depends, besides output, upon the price (vector) of variable inputs w, h(.) is the 
adjustment cost function for output, and i(.) is the cost of external debt function which 
depends upon the value of production and upon the (end of period) stock of outstanding 
debt b. 
Note that the product i(.)b is equal to the amount of interest payments due on 
external funds. We presume that, because of the existence of imperfect capital markets, 
the interest rate depends positively upon the end of period debt-to-size ratio. In the 
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present framework it is natural to proxy size with the amount of sales, so that the debt-
to-output ratio is our measure of leverage (see also Faini and De Melo, 1990). We 
therefore presume, ceteris paribus, that the cost of external funds is lower the higher 
revenues are. As for output production, we assume that the cost of adjusting production 
levels is increasing and convex in the rate of change of output, i.e. increasing in today’s 
production but negatively related to yesterday’s output level. Finally, as usual, variable 
costs are increasing both in output and in input prices. 
Let us first consider the optimality condition for debt which is: 
 
( ) ( )1 1 1 1 01 1 1− + − + +




=+ + +E i i tb bt t t t t t tβ τ
∂
∂,          (3) 
This equation is an arbitrage condition which yields an interior solution for debt. The 
optimal stock of debt is given by the level at which the after tax rate of return on assets 
equals the interest rate on debt.4 This equality holds in expectation for all periods from t 
onwards.5 
The optimality condition for the price control is quite a lengthy expression, 
which can be simplified by first introducing the following variable: 
 
( ) ( )µ ∂∂
∂
∂
∂
∂t t t
t
t
D t
p
D t
v
v
p
= +            (4) 
 
Let vt represent the vector of the prices charged by the other firms in the industry. The 
variable µt  summarizes the impact of a price change on our firm’s production level and 
is given by the sum of two terms: the first is the direct effect, while the second one is 
the strategic effect. While the former effect is always negative, we take the latter to be 
positive. This assumption implies that consumers view the products in the industry as 
substitutes (so that ∂ ∂D t vt( ) / > 0) and that firms in the industry treat prices as strategic 
                                                 
4  The discount rate in (3) is equal to βt t tr, ( )+ + −= +1 1 11 , where r is the (exogenously given) before tax 
nominal rate of return on firm’s assets. 
5  Although assumed to hold for the current and all future periods, the optimality condition (3) will not be 
exploited in the econometric analysis below. 
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 6/1997 
 
 9
complements (so that ∂ ∂v t pt( ) / > 0 ). The optimality condition for the firm’s output 
price is then given by the following Euler equation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1− + − −




τ µ ∂∂
∂
∂t t t t tq t p
c t
q
h t
q
( )          (5) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ]− − +
 +
+ +  =+ +E
h t
q
i t
p q
q t p bt t t t t
t t t
t t tβ τ µ ∂ ∂
∂
∂ µ, ( )1 11
1 1
0  
 
Equation (5) states that along the optimal path marginal benefits and marginal costs of 
changing the output price must offset each other. First of all, note that a price change 
affects the firm’s production level via the product demand as given in (1). We allow for 
strategic considerations in that the firm’s price affects demand also via the impact upon 
the rivals’ price (see (4)). According to (5) costs include the marginal production cost 
and the marginal cost of adjusting output today triggered by a price change; benefits 
comprise marginal revenue, the saving in adjustment cost due to not having to adjust 
output tomorrow, and the lower interest payments due to spreading a given amount of 
debt on a larger firm's size (recall that this effect is negative). Let us now define the 
following variable: 
 
( ) ( )λ ∂∂
∂
∂
∂
∂t t
t
t t
D t
v
v
p
D t
p
= 

            (6) 
 
In view of the assumptions made about the components of (4) λt  is non positive.6 In the 
case of a monopolistic firm λ t = 0 . More generally the size of λt  will depend on the 
size of the strategic effect compared to that of the direct effect, the former depending in 
turn on the degree of product differentiation, measured by ( )∂ ∂D t vt , and on the 
tightness of price competition, measured by ∂ ∂v pt t . 
                                                 
6  Clearly, µ  in (4) and λ  in (6) are related, as µ λ ∂ ∂t t tD t p= +( )( ( ) / )1 . 
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Divide now equation (5) by pt and by ( )∂ ∂D t pt  to obtain the following 
condition that describes the optimal price path: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1− + + − + − +
τ
∂
∂ λ
∂
∂ λ
∂
∂ λt t
t
t
t
t t
t
t t
t
q t
p
p
D
c t
q p
h t
q p
      (7) 
( )− −+ +Et t t tβ τ, 1 11 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )∂ ∂ λ ∂∂ ∂∂ λh tq p i tp q q tp pD bt t t t t t tt t t
+ + +
+ + +


 =
1 1
1
1
1 0
( )
 
 
Now let ( / )( / )∂ ∂ εp D q pt t t t t=  be the inverse of the direct effect price elasticity and 
let marginal cost be given by ∂ ∂ ηc t q c qt t t t( ) / ( / )= , where ηt  denotes the cost 
elasticity of output, the reciprocal of the scale elasticity. Using these definitions and 
dividing equation (7) by ( )1− τ t  we obtain: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ε λ η λ ∂∂ λt t t tt t t t t t
c
q p
h t
q p
+ + − + − +1 1 1 1 1         (8) 
( )
( )−
−
−+
+Et t t
t
t
β ττ, 1
11
1
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]∂ ∂ λ ∂∂ ε λh tq p i tp q bt t t t t t t t+
 + +
+ + +  =
1 1
1
1
1 0 
 
Observe now that the second and third terms of equation (8) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1+ −  + + − = + + −

λ λ η λ ηt
t t t
t t
t t
t
t t
t t t
t
t t
p q c
p q
c
p q
PCM
c
p q
     (9) 
 
where PCMt is the firm’s price-cost margin. Substitute (9) into (8) and divide 
throughout by ( )1+ λt  to finally obtain the following expression for the firm’s price-
cost margin: 
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( ) ( )
( )
PCM
c
p q
h t
q pt t
t
t t
t
t t t
= − − + +η
ε
λ
∂
∂1 1
1
       (10) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )+ +



 +
+
+ +












++ + +ρ ∂ ∂ ρ
∂
∂
ε
λt t t t t t
t
t
t t
h t
q p
i t
p q
b v1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1  
 
In writing down equation (10) we have replaced expected values with realizations, 
thereby introducing a forecast error νt+1  which is by assumption orthogonal to the 
agent’s information set and have defined ρ β τ τt t t t t tE+ + += − −1 1 11 1, ( ) / ( )  as the after tax 
discount rate between t and t+1. 
In order to make the Euler equation (10) for the firm’s price operational we need 
to parametrize the adjustment cost and the external debt functions respectively. To this 
end we posit the following simple functional forms: 
 
( )h q q
q
qt t
t
t⋅ = −


−
−
−
α 1 1
1
2
12
         (11) 
( )i b
p q
t
t t
⋅ = + 


−
− −
α α2 3 1
1 1
         (12) 
Using (11) and (12) into (10) we obtain: 
 
( )PCM cp qt t tt t t t= − − + +η
ε
λ1 1 α ρ1
1
1
1
1
2 2
20 5
q q
p q
q q
p q
t t
t t
t
t t
t t
− − −


−
−
+
+.     (13) 
  − 

 + +









 ++ +α ρ
ε
λ3 1
2
11
1t
t
t t
t
t
t
b
p q
v  
 
After some straightforward algebra and assuming that ηt, εt and λt are both time and 
firm invariant, we can rewrite equation (13) as follows: 
 
PCMt = +γ 1 γ ρ2 1
1
1
1
2 2
20 5
q q
p q
q q
p q
t t
t t
t
t t
t t
− − −


−
−
+
+. + 

 ++ +γ ρ3 1
2
1t
t
t t
t
b
p q
v    (14) 
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where PCM p q c p qt t t t t t= −( ) /η  and where, relative to (13), we have: 
( )γ ε λ1 1= − + , γ α2 1= , and ( )[ ]γ α ε λ3 3 1 1= − + + . In equation (14) the dependent 
variable is modified in order to allow for the existence of variable returns to scale. 
Among other things, this specification improves the quality of our accounting measure 
of PCM as a proxy for the ratio of price to marginal costs. In fact, when returns to scale 
are decreasing (η>1) marginal costs are higher than total average costs ct , while the 
opposite occurs when returns to scale are increasing (η<1). 
In estimating (14) we expect γ1 to be negative and γ2 to be positive. In particular, 
the last regressor of the equation measures the impact of imperfect capital markets on 
the firm’s markup. The sign of γ 3  is not univocally defined and is discussed in the next 
section. Finally, since the true value of η is unknown, we will check the robustness of 
our findings with respect to alternative plausible values for the cost elasticity. 
3. Capital Market Imperfections and Firms’ Markup Decisions 
From equation (13) it appears that the impact of capital market imperfections on 
markup decisions depends crucially upon the sign of the following partial derivative: 
 
∂
∂α ρ
ε
λ
PCM b
p q
t
t
t
t t
t
t3
1
2
1
1= − 

 + +



+         (15) 
 
In particular, following an  increase in the premium on external finance parametrized 
here by α3, firms will have an incentive to cut prices if  
 
λ εt t> −1           (16) 
 
Obviously, if the inequality is reverse, firms will instead react to an increase in financial 
constraints by raising prices.  
To make things simple, let us start from the benchmark case of a monopolisitc 
firm, where λt is equal to zero. Since εt  is bounded between zero and one in absolute 
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value, condition (16) always holds and consequently expression (15) is univocally 
signed and it is negative. This implies that monopolistic firms find it optimal to respond 
to an increase in the tightness of financing constraints by lowering the markup. Also, 
the more elastic market demand is, the bigger is the price cut, following a given 
increase in the premium on external finance, α3. The intuition behind this result is 
simple: if financial market imperfections become more important, firms will cut prices 
to increase sales. The incentive to do so is higher when demand is elastic since in this 
case total sales are more sensitive to a price reduction.  
Things become more complicated when we relax the assumption of a monopoly 
market structure and allow firms to compete in an oligopolisitic setting. In fact, in this 
case the strategic effect of a price change is not zero and it depends both on the degree 
of product differentiation and the tightness of price competition (see (6)). This can be 
easily understood if we rewrite condition (16) as follows: 
 
1
1ε ω θt t t
− >            (17) 
 
where ωt denotes the cross-price elasticity of demand, ( / )( / )∂ ∂D v v qt t t t , and where θt  
denotes the conjectural elasticity, ( / )( / )∂ ∂v p p vt t t t . Condition (17) has a 
straightforward economic interpretation: for given values of the parameters defining the 
demand conditions in the industry, εt e ωt, the incentive to cut prices in order to increase 
sales becomes weaker the more aggressive price competition gets. Also, in some 
circumstances the negative strategic effect can more than offset the positive direct effect 
of a price cut on sales and consequently inequality (17) may not hold.7 For instance, this 
happens to be the case if a price war follows the decision of financing constrained firms 
to cut prices. 
Summarizing, our model suggests that firms facing imperfections in capital 
markets have a natural tendency to cut their output price in order to reduce the premium 
on the cost of external finance. This effect is stronger, the more elastic market demand 
                                                 
7 Formally inequality (17) holds only if ( ) ( )θ ε ε ωt t t t< −1 . 
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is, the more products in the industry are differentiated, and the softer is rivals’ behavior. 
However, if rivals react very aggressively to price reductions, our overall conclusions 
may not hold and financially constrained firms might find it rational to raise their price. 
It is then an empirical matter to discriminate between these alternative hypotheses. This 
is the issue to which we now turn. 
 
4. Data Description 
The dataset used in the econometric analysis below is based on an unbalanced 
panel constructed by CERIS-CNR by merging balance sheet data collected by 
Mediobanca, a large investment bank, with industry level data provided by ISTAT, the 
Italian Central Statistical Office. In its latest version, the panel includes some 1,318 
manufacturing firms with no less than five consecutive observations over the 1977-1993 
period. The total number of firm-year observations is equal to 11,127.8 
For our empirical analysis we have extracted observations relative to privately-
owned firms producing differentiated products, thus obtaining a smaller sample of 5,110 
firm-year observations relative to 599 companies. Table 1 provides a description of the 
unbalanced structure of the sample. Even if the database covers the 1977-1993 period, 
the estimation period is 1981-1993, since four cross sections are lost in constructing 
lags and taking first differences. 
In order to identify firms operating in industries with product differentiation, the 
methodology developed by Davies and Lyons (1996) has been adopted. In particular, 
firms are supposed to produce differentiated goods if the main industry in which they 
operate is advertising intensive or R&D intensive, or both. The term “intensive” refers 
here to advertising-to-sales or R&D-to-sales ratios higher than 1%. This definition is 
based on the observation that in most cases, (both horizontal and vertical) product 
                                                 
8  The documentation concerning the characteristics of the dataset is contained in an appendix available 
from the authors upon request (see Margon, Sembenelli, and Vannoni, 1995). The industries with 
product differentiation are listed in that appendix and also in Davies and Lyons (1996). The after tax 
nominal discount rate used in estimation is based on the yield of 12 month Treasury Bills (BOT) plus a 
3% constant risk premium and on the statutory rates of company income taxes at both regional (ILOR) 
and national (IRPEG) levels. 
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differentiation is neither intrinsic to the product nor obtainable by simple design without 
any major investment. More often, product differentiation is a costly activity, requiring 
investments in R&D or advertising.9 
Since our analysis also focuses on the impact of financing constraints on the 
behavior of the markups over the cycle, we have referred to the detrended industrial 
production series calculated by Schlitzer (1993) as the indicator of the general business 
cycle. Accordingly, 1977, 1980-1982, 1989-1993 are defined as recessionary years, 
while 1978-1979 and 1983-1988 are considered expansionary periods. This 
classification is rather robust to the use of alternative indicators of demand, like GDP or 
industry specific indicators. 
In Table 2, we report descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the 
empirical analysis over both the full period (1977-1993) and the estimation period 
(1981-1993). The same statistics are also provided separately for recessionary and 
expansionary periods. In what follows we offer a few comments pertaining to the 
estimation period. However, very similar considerations hold for the statistics computed 
over the full sample. 
The price-cost margin, PCM hereafter, has been calculated as the ratio of 
operating profits to sales, operating profits being given by the difference between value 
added and labour costs. This variable has been adopted as the accounting proxy for the 
ratio of price to marginal cost.10 PCM is lower during recessions than during expansions 
and this fact provides support to the idea of procyclical behavior of markups. The same 
pattern is found for the average value of EMPLOYEES, whereas financial 
LEVERAGE, defined as the ratio of total financial debt to sales, is higher in recessions 
than in expansions. As can be seen from  the statistics on SALES and DEBT, the 
countercyclical behavior of LEVERAGE depends more upon the procyclical behavior 
of SALES than upon the procyclical behavior of DEBT. Incidentally, this is what one 
                                                 
9  This opens up the possibility that financially constrained firms in product differentiated industries cut 
on R&D and advertising activities in bad times. Unfortunately, at the present stage data limitations 
prevent us from pursuing this line of research. 
10  However, there exists a growing body of applied papers which obtain the markup over marginal cost 
as a parameter or a combination of parameters from the econometric estimation of structural models 
(see, among others, Galeotti and Schiantarelli, 1994; Sembenelli, 1996; and the references therein). 
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would expect if capital market imperfections were likely to be more important in bad 
times. 
We are aware that the debt to sales ratio departs from the standard measure of 
financial leverage, computed as the ratio of the market value of debt to the market value 
of debt plus equity. However, since data on market values are not available, we tried to 
minimize potential biases involved in the measurement of firm’s total assets from 
accounting data, by choosing a relatively non-controversial variable. 
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Equation (14) has been estimated for the sample of 599 firms producing 
differentiated goods described in the previous section. The estimation technique used is 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) discussed in Arellano and Bond (1991). 
Given the dynamic nature of our model and the endogenous nature of regressors, this 
estimation method allows to obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients by using 
appropriate lags of regressors as instruments. In all estimated equations, the error term 
is modelled as the sum of a firm specific effect and a white noise idiosyncratic shock. 
To deal with firm specific effects we estimate the model in first differences, thereby 
introducing first order autocorrelation in the error term. As the validity of instruments 
depends upon the absence of autocorrelation and differencing introduces first order 
correlation, valid instruments are dated t-2 or earlier. Appropriate tests for first and 
second order residual autocorrelation (m1 and m2) are reported in the tables. Moreover, 
we also report the Sargan test on the correlation of instruments with the error term. 
Finally, Wald tests for the joint significance of regressors (W1) are reported. 
In the first column of Table 3  the results obtained from estimating equation (14) 
under the assumption of constant returns to scale (η=1) are presented. The Sargan test 
does not point to any misspecification of the model. As expected, the m1 statistic 
suggests the presence of first order autocorrelation, while the m2 statistic leads us to 
reject the hypothesis of second order autocorrelation, in line with the assumed 
stochastic structure of the disturbances. Moreover, all coefficients are significantly 
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different from zero. In particular, the coefficient of the adjustment cost function α1=γ2 is 
positive as predicted by the theory and statistically significant. We note that this fact 
holds true for all the estimated equations presented in this paper. 
By taking the ratio γ γ3 1 1/ ( )−  we can recover the point estimate of α3 which is 
equal to 0.050. The fact that this coefficient is positive and significant implies that firms 
are paying a positive premium on external funds due to the existence of imperfect 
capital markets. As it has already been discussed in Section 4, the impact of capital 
market imperfections on markup decisions depends upon the sign of the derivative in 
(15): if it is negative, then capital market imperfections induce firms to lower markups 
(by cutting the output price) in order to mitigate agency problems. By replacing 
( )ε λ1+  with -γ1 in (15) it can be easily seen that this is indeed the case: firms have an 
incentive to cut price in order to boost their sales and in turn to lessen financing 
constraints. In order to understand the relative importance of the direct as opposed to 
the strategic price effect on output, we should be able to measure separately ε and λ. 
Unfortunately, since the model is underidentified, we cannot disentangle the two 
effects. What we can say is that, given demand conditions, firms are not competing too 
aggressively, so that it is rational for the firm to reduce her price, and hence the markup, 
as financing constraints become more severe. 
One potential limitation of the results presented in the first column of Table 3 
is that all parameters are assumed to be constant over time. Since the literature suggests 
that financing constraints may vary over the cycle, we have reestimated equation (14) 
by allowing the parameters to differ across expansions and recessions (Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1996). To this end we have used a dummy variable taking on the 
value one in expansionary years and zero otherwise.11 Results are reported in the second 
column of Table 3. They imply a coefficient α3 equal to 0.059 during recessionary 
periods and to 0.053 in expansionary ones. Although point estimates suggest that 
financing constraints are slightly more severe during recessions, the hypothesis that the 
two coefficients are equal cannot be rejected at conventional statistical levels.12 
                                                 
11  See Section 4 for the precise definition. 
12  An even less restrictive approach would be to allow the coefficients to be estimated separately for each 
year. When we do this, even if the relevant parameters are not always precisely estimated, we find that 
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The results presented in Table 3 have been obtained under the assumption of 
constant returns to scale. This hypothesis has been introduced by imposing η=1 in 
equation (13), where η represents the reciprocal of the scale elasticity. In order to check 
the robustness of our findings with respect to different hypotheses concerning the 
degree of scale returns, we have reestimated the model assuming different plausible 
values for the parameter η. In Table 4 estimates of equation (13) are reported under two 
alternative assumptions, namely η=1.1 (decreasing returns to scale) and η=0.9 
(increasing returns to scale). Both estimates confirm previous results on the existence of 
capital markets imperfections and their effects on firms’ markup policies.13 
One controversial aspect of results commented upon so far is that the parameter 
of the agency cost function, α3, does not seem to depend on general macro-economic 
conditions. To shed further light on this issue we have followed an approach which is 
very common in the literature on financing constraints. This approach consists in 
splitting the sample according to firm specific variables proxying for the extent of 
agency problems and testing the model on each sub-sample. We experimented different 
sample splits.14 The most interesting results have been obtained by using the firm’s 
financial position at the beginning of each time period as sample splitting criterion. 
Accordingly, for each year we have calculated mean values across firms of the debt to 
sales ratio and we have constructed a firm-year specific dummy which is equal to one 
(resp. zero) if the debt to sales ratio is higher (resp. lower) than the yearly average 
across firms. This implies introducing a non-linearity in the agency cost function, where 
the α3 parameter is allowed to take two different values depending on whether the 
firm’s financial position is above (resp. below) a time-dependent threshold. 
                                                                                                                                               
the overall results confirm the main findings just presented. We do not report these results for reason of 
space. 
13 This result holds even for more extreme departures from the constant returns to scale assumption. 
14  The applied literature on financing constraints has often adopted firm size as a sample splitting 
criterion. The idea is that size helps mitigating agency problems as small firms are more likely to have 
a lower collateral relative to liabilities than large firms (see the discussion in Schiantarelli, 1996). 
When we distinguish between small and large firms on the basis of employment, we find that both 
types of firms pay a premium on external funds. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two 
coefficients α3 are equal at conventional levels. Similar difficulties are encountered in the case of 
investment when splitting the data according to size (see Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Galeotti, 
Schiantarelli, and Jaramillo, 1993; Rondi, Sembenelli, and Zanetti, 1994). 
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The basic results are presented in the first column of Table 5. The point 
estimates of α3 are 0.087 and 0.055 for high and low leveraged firms respectively. 
Moreover, the two coefficients are statistically different at conventional statistical 
levels. Thus, this result suggests that the agency cost function is non-linear, as not only 
the premium on external finance but also α3  depend on firm’s debt to sales ratio. 
However, this happens to hold only in expansionary periods. In fact, as the second 
column of Table 5 shows, when we allow the coefficients to depend both on the firm’s 
financial position (high/low leverage) and on general macro-economic conditions 
(expansions/recessions), the implied point estimates of α3 show that in recessionary 
periods the two parameters are not significantly different from each other (0.085 for 
high leveraged firms and 0.077 for low leveraged firms) whereas they are different and 
significantly so in expansionsionary periods (0.083 for high leveraged firms and 0.025 
for low leveraged firms). These results suggest that, everything else equal, financial 
market imperfections are higher in bad times, since, at least for low leveraged firms, α3 
is found to be lower when the economy is buoyant. This implies that the countercyclical 
behavior of financing constraints induces a procyclical behavior of markups. This 
finding is in line with the predictions of the theoretical model by Hendel (1996) and 
contrary to the countercyclical explanation put forth by Chevalier and Scharfstein 
(1995, 1996). 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated, both theoretically and empirically, the effects 
of capital markets imperfections on firms’ markup policies and on their cyclical 
behavior. This is an important, yet still relatively unexplored area. 
We have presented a model of a firm operating in an industry with differentiated 
products. The model results in an Euler equation describing the optimal intertemporal 
price strategy of the firm which faces imperfect capital markets and costs of changing 
output production levels. The wedge between the cost of external finance and internally 
generated funds driven by capital market imperfections has been modeled through an 
increasing cost function of external debt. In addition, we have taken into account the 
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oligopolistic interaction among firms by considering both the direct and the strategic 
effects of price changes on output levels. 
We have discussed the implications of the model as far as the impact of capital 
markets imperfections on markup policies is concerned: in particular, the model 
suggests that, for given demand conditions, the tightness of product competition is the 
crucial parameter. Whereas in monopoly the firm tends to cut her price (and lower 
markup) in order to relax financing constraints, in an oligopolistic setting the direct 
effect of a price reduction by the firm must be compared with the strategic effect due to 
rivals’ behavior, after taking into account the degree of product differentiation. If rivals 
do not react or react softly to a price reduction, then firms have a greater incentive to 
reduce markups when financing constraints become more severe; on the contrary, if 
firms react aggressively the previous conclusions may even be reversed and firms may 
find it rational to raise prices. 
The empirical results suggest that capital market imperfections are present in the 
sense that firms in our sample pay a premium on external finance which significantly 
depends on the debt to sales ratio; moreover, according to our estimates, it is optimal for 
constrained firms to cut their price compared to unconstrained firms. Furthermore, 
whereas the premium on external finance does not depend upon general macroeconomic 
conditions for high leveraged firms, we find that low leveraged firms pay an higher 
premium in recessions than in expansions. As a consequence our estimates show that 
firms are more likely to be financially constrained in recessions. Hence our results 
imply that financial market imperfections tend to make markups procyclical. 
Finally, to get a more complete picture of the determinants of observed markup 
behavior, it would be informative to disentangle the role played by demand conditions 
and by the nature of competition in explaining the relationship between capital markets 
imperfections and markups. More generally , additional evidence is needed, possibly 
stemming from modeling jointly the pricing, output and inventory decisions of firms. 
These issues are next in our future research agenda. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the Sample 
 
Years of  
observations 
Number of firms 
  
5 121 
6 78 
7 87 
8 78 
9 55 
10 37 
11 34 
12 25 
13 16 
14 22 
15 14 
16 5 
17 27 
  
Total number of 
observations: 5110 
Total number of 
firms: 599 
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Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
(a) Full Sample: 1977-1993 
 
Variable Total Period Recessions Expansions 
 5110 Observations 2618 Observations 2492 Observations 
  
PCM 0.107 0.103 0.111 
 (0.082) (0.088) (0.075) 
EMPLOYEES 1134 1054 1217 
 (4427) (4613) (4222) 
SALES 169557 165388 173937 
 (510716) (416898) (593571) 
DEBT 34307 35191 33379 
 (111620) (103735) (119357) 
LEVERAGE 0.227 0.242 0.212 
 (0.236) (0.239) (0.233) 
 
 
 
(b) Estimation Sample: 1981-1993 
 
Variable Total Period Recessions Expansions 
 2714 Observations 1549 Observations 1165 Observations 
  
PCM 0.105 0.099 0.113 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.076) 
EMPLOYEES 1076 866 1356 
 (3299) (1656.) (4648) 
SALES 207335 193054 226352 
 (571820) (381295) (753982) 
DEBT 37603 37767 37517 
 (93647) (63927) (122535) 
LEVERAGE 0.217 0.236 0.192 
 (0.218) (0.242) (0.178) 
 
Note to the table: Average values. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
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Table 3: Estimates of the Markup Equation with Constant 
Returns to Scale and Cyclical effects- Total Sample. 
 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
    
γ1 -0.0033 
(0.0001) 
γ1exp -0.0017 
(0.0003) 
γ2 0.0431 
(0.0010) 
γ1rec -0.0045 
(0.0003) 
γ3 -0.0502 
(0.0019) 
γ2exp 0.0937 
(0.0014) 
  γ2rec -0.0051 
(0.0031) 
  γ3exp -0.0538 
(0.0031) 
  γ3rec -0.0598 
(0.0034) 
    
    
W1 2621.2 
(3) 
W1 5792.4 
(6) 
Sargan 173.44 
(167) 
Sargan 159.41 
(156) 
m1 -4.093 m1 -4.472 
m2 -1.208 m2 -1.701 
    
 
Notes to the table: 
(i) Equation (14) in the main text. Dependent variable: PCM. (ii) 
Sample period: 1981-1993. Number of firms: 599. Number of 
observations: 2,714. (iii) Asymptotic robust standard errors and degrees 
of freedom in parenthesis. (iv) W1 is a Wald Test of joint significance of 
the regressors, asymptotically distributed as χ2. (v) Sargan is a test of 
correlation among instruments and residuals, asymptotically distributed 
as χ2. (vi) m1 is a test for first order autocorrelation asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1). (vii) m2 is a test for second order autocorrelation, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1). (viii) Instruments used are a 
constant and the two regressors of equation (14) in the text, both dated 
(t-3 )and earlier. 
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Table 4: Estimates of the Markup Equation with Variable 
Returns to Scale - Total Sample 
 
 
Decreasing Returns to Scale 
(η = 11. ) 
Increasing Returns to Scale 
(η = 0 9. ) 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
    
γ1 -0.0032 
(0.0001) 
γ1 -0.0034 
(0.0001) 
γ2 0.0518 
(0.0011) 
γ2 0.0344 
(0.001) 
γ3 -0.0572 
(0.0019) 
γ3 -0.0437 
(0.0018) 
    
    
W1 3210.9 
(3) 
W1 2130.0 
(3) 
Sargan 173.94 
(167) 
Sargan 173.54 
(167) 
m1 -4.089 m1 -4.108 
m2 -1.210 m2 -1.182 
    
 
Notes to the table: See Table 3. 
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Table 5: Estimates of the Markup Equation with Constant 
Returns to Scale and Cyclical Effects  
High-Low Leveraged Firms 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
    
γ1high -0.009004 
(0.000318) 
γ1high-rec -0.008619 
(0.000501) 
γ1low 0.000659 
(0.000513) 
γ1high-exp -0.010155 
(0.000632) 
γ2high 0.005276 
(0.002675) 
γ1low-rec -0.003218 
(0.000708) 
γ2low 0.099525 
(0.002726) 
γ1low-exp 0.007073 
(0.000978) 
γ3high -0.087379 
(0.003742) 
γ2high-rec 0.008713 
(0.005702) 
γ3low -0.054669 
(0.005496) 
γ2high-exp 0.000109 
(0.004408) 
  γ2low-rec 0.051159 
(0.003017) 
  γ2low-exp 0.132671 
(0.004913) 
  γ3high-rec -0.084014 
(0.004728) 
  γ3high-exp -0.082122 
(0.004463) 
  γ3low-rec -0.076300 
(0.014514) 
  γ3low-exp -0.024904 
(0.006811) 
    
    
W1 3462.12 
(6) 
W1 3015.12 
(12) 
Sargan 157.53 
(151) 
Sargan 146.07 
(145) 
m1 -5.001 m1 -4.703 
m2 -0.378 m2 -0.568 
    
 
Notes to the table: see Table 3.  
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